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CASE COMMENT
GOODYEAR DUNLOP’S FAILED ATTEMPT TO REFINE THE
SCOPE OF GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846
(2011)
Camilla Cohen∗
In first-year civil procedure, students spend a great deal of time parsing
an “answer” to a deceptively simple question: When may a state exercise
its adjudicatory authority over an out-of-state defendant? Since Pennoyer v.
Neff, the United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of personal
jurisdiction in at least thirty-five cases spanning three centuries.1 Following
the Court’s decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,2 a state’s
exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant must satisfy two
requirements. First, the state must have a statutory basis for asserting
adjudicatory authority over a foreign defendant.3 Second, if the claims
satisfy the statutory requirements for jurisdiction, the state must further
determine whether the foreign defendant has established “minimum
contacts” with the forum “such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”4 Rooted in
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, this second inquiry
places a limit on the state’s adjudicatory authority in order to ensure the
“fair and orderly administration of the laws.”5

∗. J.D. 2013, University of Florida Levin College of Law; M.S.T. 2010, Fordham
University; B.A. 2008, University of Florida. I would like to thank Professor Amy Mashburn for
inspiring me to write this Comment and the Florida Law Review for their professionalism and
constant attention to detail. I am also eternally grateful to my family for all of their love and support
along the way.
1. See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905);
Bagdon v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N.Y. 432, 111 N.E. 1075 (1916); Int’l
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S.
437 (1952); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977);
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Helicopteros Nacionales de
Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462
(1985); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burnham v. Superior
Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
2. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1068.1 (3d ed. 2002) (stating that “state long-arm statutes simply cannot reach beyond the limits
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
4. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
5. Id. at 319.
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Following the minimum contacts requirement set forth in International
Shoe,6 personal jurisdiction jurisprudence has developed significantly over
time. The development of this doctrine, however, has focused heavily on
cases dealing with specific jurisdiction.7 Until 2011, Perkins v. Benguet8
and Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall9 were the only Supreme
Court cases that analyzed the scope of general personal jurisdiction.10
Consequently, lower courts were left to develop the contours of general
personal jurisdiction, resulting in a hodgepodge of inconsistent holdings
that often conflated several important distinctions between specific and
general jurisdiction.11 Now, twenty-eight years after Helicopteros, the
Supreme Court has finally revisited general personal jurisdiction in
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown.12
This Comment analyzes the Court’s recent decision in Goodyear,
concluding that the case produced the correct result, but failed to provide
any meaningful future guidance for lower courts. One significant
shortcoming of the case is the absence of any theoretical justification for
the assertion of general personal jurisdiction. Without a basis for
determining why general jurisdiction is appropriate in some circumstances
and not others, the Court missed an opportunity to encourage a semblance
of consistency in lower court decisions concerning general personal
jurisdiction.13 Additionally, the decision failed to provide a clear analytical
framework for deciding future cases. While the decision may be interpreted
as refining the test for asserting general jurisdiction, Goodyear could just
6. Id. at 310.
7. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011); see
also Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in a TwentyFirst Century World, 64 FLA. L. REV. 387, 423–24 (2012) [hereinafter Rhodes, Nineteenth Century
Personal Jurisdiction] (stating that Perkins and Helicopteros “comprised the entirety of the
Supreme Court’s post-Shoe discussion of general jurisdiction”). The difference between specific
and general jurisdiction is that the former may be asserted over a foreign defendant if the
defendant’s contacts with the forum are related to the plaintiff’s cause of action. Arthur T. von
Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 1121, 1136 (1966). On the other hand, general jurisdiction may be asserted over a nonresident
defendant for any cause of action unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. Id. Until
recently, the relevant inquiry for an assertion of general jurisdiction was whether the defendant’s
contacts with the forum were “continuous . . . substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit
against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” Int’l
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.
8. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
9. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
10. See Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 422–24.
11. Id. at 424; Friedrich K. Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 141, 152 (2001); Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 721, 724 (1988) [hereinafter Brilmayer et al., A General Look].
12. 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 58–61 for a discussion of the inconsistent lower court
decisions regarding general personal jurisdiction.
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as easily be narrowly confined to its facts in light of the manner in which
the Court framed the issues.14
In April 2004, Julian Brown and Matthew Helms died in a bus accident
while heading to the Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris, France.15 The
victims were two thirteen-year-old boys from North Carolina.16 Following
the boys’ deaths, their parents, as administrators of their estates, sued in the
North Carolina Superior Court for wrongful death.17 The complaint
attributed the accident to defective tires manufactured by Goodyear USA—
an Ohio corporation—and its foreign subsidiaries.18 As such, Goodyear
USA, Goodyear Luxembourg, Goodyear Turkey, and Goodyear France
were all named as defendants.19
Unlike their parent corporation, Goodyear USA, the foreign subsidiaries
all moved to dismiss the claims against them on the basis that North
Carolina’s courts lacked adjudicatory authority over them.20 The North
Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the
defendants’ motion.21
The North Carolina Court of Appeals agreed that North Carolina lacked
specific jurisdiction over the defendants.22 This was because the accident
occurred in France and the faulty tire giving rise to the accident was
manufactured in Turkey.23 In sum, the defendants lacked the relevant
contacts with North Carolina to make them amenable to suit on the basis of
specific jurisdiction.24 The appellate court found, however, that the foreign
subsidiaries’ contacts with North Carolina rendered the defendants
amenable to suit on the basis of general jurisdiction.25 The court based its
holding on a “stream of commerce” theory, reasoning that the quantum of
the defendants’ tires that reached North Carolina’s markets was sufficient
to establish general jurisdiction.26 After the North Carolina Supreme Court
denied the defendants’ appeal, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the summer of 2011.27
Corporate entities like Goodyear USA’s subsidiaries, while
incorporated in one state, are technically “present” in numerous states.
14. Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 549, 551–52 (2012).
15. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2851–52.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2852.
21. Id.
22. Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 388 (N.C. App. 2009).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 395.
26. Id.
27. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011).
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Recognizing the legal fiction of the corporate entity,28 International Shoe
expanded territorial notions of sovereignty and personal jurisdiction by
adopting the following minimum contacts standard:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.’29
The holding expanded personal jurisdiction by considering a foreign
corporation’s contacts with the forum state—as opposed to physical
presence—as the relevant inquiry for asserting personal jurisdiction.30 The
Court determined that a foreign defendant could be considered “present” in
the state where the defendant’s activities had been “continuous and
systematic” and those activities had “give[n] rise to the liabilities sued
on.”31 Additionally, the Court recognized an alternate basis for jurisdiction
where a foreign defendant’s contacts were “continuous,” “substantial[,]
and of such a nature as to justify suit against it” on an unrelated claim.32
In an effort to label International Shoe’s revised bases for asserting
personal jurisdiction, Professors Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman
coined the terms “general jurisdiction” and “specific jurisdiction” in
1966.33 Although not phrased as such, International Shoe recognized this
distinction when Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone differentiated between
activities that had “give[n] rise to the liabilities sued on,”34 and activities
that were “continuous,” “substantial,” and of “such a nature as to justify
suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct
from those activities.”35 Today, the former category is regarded as specific
jurisdiction, while the latter category is regarded as general jurisdiction.36
28. Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 393.
29. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
30. The Court noted “the terms ‘present’ or ‘presence’ are used merely to symbolize those
activities of the corporation’s agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to
satisfy the demands of due process.” As such, physical presence was no longer the only factor in
establishing personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. Instead, presence would be determined
by analyzing a foreign defendant’s contacts with the state. Id. at 316–17.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 318 (stating that courts have justified adjudicating a claim when “continuous
corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit
against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities”).
33. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 7, at 1136.
34. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
35. Id. at 318.
36. While the decision of International Shoe created two distinct bases for asserting personal
jurisdiction, Mary Twitchell has argued that the decision actually minimized the role of general
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After the Supreme Court adopted the minimum contacts standard, the
development of specific jurisdiction far outpaced that of general
jurisdiction.37 Until recently, the Court had only addressed the issue of
general jurisdiction in Perkins and Helicopteros.38 Notably, Perkins is the
only post-International Shoe case that established the requisite contacts
necessary for applying general jurisdiction.39 In that case, the defendant,
Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, was initially located in the
Philippines, but the Japanese occupation of the islands forced the
company’s president to evacuate and move to his home state of Ohio.40
While in Ohio, the president maintained an office where he conducted all
of the company’s affairs for the duration of the war.41 Specifically, the
defendant
carried on there correspondence relating to the business of the
company and to its employees. He drew and
distributed . . . salary checks on behalf of the
company . . . . He used and maintained . . . two active bank
accounts carrying substantial balances of company funds.42
The Court held that these contacts, taken together, were continuous and
substantial enough to justify suit against the company on causes of action
arising from dealings entirely distinct from its contacts with the forum
state.43
Thirty-two years later, the Supreme Court revisited general jurisdiction
in Helicopteros.44 In that case, a Columbian corporation, Helicol, provided
transportation for oil and construction companies in South America.45 One
jurisdiction. Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 625
(1988). Instead of providing an equal and distinct basis for jurisdiction, the category of general
jurisdiction was actually intended “as a secondary basis for jurisdiction, important primarily when
the cause of action did not arise from [the] defendant’s forum activities.” Id.
37. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011).
38. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415–16 (1984) (“We
thus must explore the nature of Helicol’s contacts with the [forum] to determine whether they
constitute the kind of continuous and systematic general business contacts the Court found to exist
in Perkins.”); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952). See also Charles
W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 807, 836 (2004)
[hereinafter Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction].
39. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854, 2857 (discussing the outcomes of Perkins, where general
jurisdiction was appropriate, and Helicopteros, and stating that the contacts were insufficient to
exercise personal jurisdiction, before ruling that the facts in the instant case were not sufficient to
establish general jurisdiction).
40. Perkins, 342 U.S at 447.
41. Id. at 447–48.
42. Id. at 448.
43. Id.
44. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 409 (1984).
45. Id.
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of its helicopters crashed in Peru.46 Among the passengers that died were
four U.S. citizens.47 The families brought an action against Helicol in
Texas.48 Because the families conceded that the facts did not support the
application of specific jurisdiction, the Court relied on a general
jurisdiction analysis in order to determine whether the foreign corporation
was amenable to suit in Texas.49
The Court’s analysis of the facts focused on comparing Helicol’s
contacts with Texas to the contacts that Benguet Mining Company had
with the state.50 According to the Court, the contacts in Perkins were
“continuous and systematic,” whereas the contacts in Helicopteros were
not.51 Helicol had received $5 million in payments drawn from a Texas
bank, travelled to Texas to negotiate a contract, purchased over $4 million
in equipment from a Texas company, and received employee training in
Texas.52
Each contact was discounted in turn. First, the Court refused to consider
the $5 million in payment as a relevant contact, because the payment arose
from the unilateral activity of a Texas resident, and not from the company
itself.53 Second, the company’s sole trip to Texas to negotiate a contract
was neither continuous nor systematic.54 Last, the mere purchase of
equipment and training was not enough to warrant the imposition of
general jurisdiction over the defendant.55
Taken together, Perkins and Helicopteros stand for the proposition that
general jurisdiction cannot rest solely on the quantitative aspect of a
defendant’s contacts with the forum.56 Instead, the nature of the contacts
should be considered as well, thus leading to a qualitative analysis.57
Arguably, Helicol’s contacts with Texas were quantitatively significant.
However, unlike the defendant’s contacts in Perkins, Helicol’s contacts
were qualitatively unsubstantial.
If we are to read the facts of each of these cases literally, they stand for
the proposition that general jurisdiction may be asserted in circumstances
where the defendant has essentially established his principal place of
business within the forum. In such a case, the contacts are sufficiently
substantial and of such a nature as to justify the defendant’s amenability to
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 410.
Id.
See generally id.
Id. at 415–16.
Id. at 416.
Id.
Id. at 410–11, 416.
Id. at 416–17.
Id. at 416.
Id. at 417.
Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, supra note 38, at 816, 836.
Id. at 816.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss4/9

6

Cohen: Goodyear Dunlop’s Failed Attempt to Refine the Scope of General P

2013]

GOODYEAR DUNLOP’S FAILED ATTEMPT

1411

suit for any cause of action. In contrast, mere purchases in the forum and
trips to the forum related to those purchases are by their nature insufficient
to grant general jurisdiction, no matter how substantial and continuous
such contacts may be. The basic qualitative difference between Perkins and
Helicopteros is that in Perkins, the out of state defendant was essentially
conducting and directing its business from within the state, whereas in
Helicopteros, the foreign defendant was conducting and directing its
business outside the state.
The holdings of Perkins and Helicopteros, however, did not provide
courts with a satisfactory theoretical framework for analyzing general
jurisdiction as it arises in a myriad of distinct factual scenarios.58 Neither
Perkins nor Helicopteros established a justification for asserting general
jurisdiction. Both opinions merely listed the defendant’s contacts with each
respective forum, deciding certain contacts warranted general jurisdiction,
while others did not. There was never a discussion as to why the contacts
in Perkins were stronger than those in Helicopteros. In fact, the analysis of
Helicopteros consisted of an ad hoc comparison between the facts of that
case and the facts in Perkins. As a result, lower courts have mirrored this
factual comparison, zoning in on the “continuous and substantial” aspect of
the International Shoe analysis, while failing to consider the decision’s
focus on the nature of those contacts.59 Likewise, lower courts bolster their
application of general jurisdiction over foreign defendants by analyzing the
relationship of the defendant’s contacts to the dispute.60 General
jurisdiction analysis, however, focuses solely on the defendant’s
relationship to the forum.61
In Goodyear, the Supreme Court was presented with the opportunity to
revisit the holdings of Perkins and Helicopteros. Many believe that the
unanimous decision in Goodyear indicates that the Court has tightened the
reins on general jurisdiction. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the
opinion of the Court, which framed the issue as whether North Carolina

58. Id. at 817; Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 119, 124–25 (2001).
59. The Myth of General Jurisdiction explains that:
Most courts simply list the defendant’s contacts and conclude that they are, or are
not, sufficient. What is not said is often more important than what is said. Not only
do courts avoid analyzing in depth the nature and scope of a defendant’s contacts
or discussing the policies underlying general jurisdiction, but they also never ask
the question that is crucial to a truly dispute-blind jurisdiction analysis: whether
the defendant’s contacts are such that the exercise of jurisdiction would be fair for
most causes of action brought by the plaintiff.
Twitchell, supra note 36, at 637.
60. Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, supra note 38, at 818.
61. Id. at 818–20; Twitchell, supra note 36, at 611–12.
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could exercise general jurisdiction over Goodyear USA’s foreign
subsidiaries based on a stream of commerce theory.62
The Court held that North Carolina’s courts lacked both personal and
general jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiaries.63 Justice Ginsburg found
that the defendants’ connections with the state were too tenuous to support
general jurisdiction.64 The defendant-petitioners’ relevant contacts (or lack
of contacts) with North Carolina were listed as follows:
[P]etitioners are not registered to do business in North
Carolina. They have no place of business, employees, or bank
accounts in North Carolina. They do not design, manufacture,
or advertise their products in North Carolina. And they do not
solicit business in North Carolina or themselves sell or ship
tires to North Carolina customers. Even so, a small percentage
of petitioners’ tires (tens of thousands out of tens of millions
manufactured between 2004 and 2007) were distributed
within North Carolina by other Goodyear USA affiliates.65
After listing petitioners’ weak connections with the state, Justice
Ginsburg proceeded to explicitly draw the line between specific and
general jurisdiction.66 As an illustration, the Court noted that the “the
paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's
domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the
corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”67 The error of North Carolina’s
courts stemmed from their failure to recognize “the essential difference
between case-specific and all-purpose (general) jurisdiction.”68
Importantly, the Court noted that the stream of commerce theory was only
relevant in the context of specific jurisdiction.69 While ties under a stream
of commerce theory might “bolster” the exercise of specific jurisdiction,
those ties “do not warrant “a determination that . . . the forum has general
jurisdiction over the defendant.”70 The Court concluded its analysis by
comparing the petitioners’ contacts with the petitioners in Perkins and
Helicopteros.71 Justice Ginsburg described the facts in Perkins as “‘[t]he

62. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850 (2011) (“Are
foreign subsidiaries of a United States parent corporation amenable to suit in state court on claims
unrelated to any activity of the subsidiaries in the forum State?”).
63. Id. at 2851.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2852.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2853–54 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 2855.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2856–57.
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textbook case of general jurisdiction appropriately exercised over a foreign
corporation that has not consented to suit in the forum.’”72
By contrast, the facts in Goodyear—even more so than those in
Helicopteros—clearly demonstrate that the defendants had only a tenuous
connection with the forum. As such, the Court’s holding came as no
surprise. However, the Court chose to go one step further: it refined
International Shoe’s analysis for general jurisdiction by emphasizing the
notion of the “home” base.73 The Court rejected North Carolina’s
reasoning that doing “some quantum of business” within the forum would
in and of itself warrant the court’s exercise of general jurisdiction.74
Rather, it found that general jurisdiction should be limited to situations
where the foreign defendant conducts intrastate operations that “are
directed, controlled, and coordinated within the state.”75
While the result was correct, the Court’s decision fell short in its
attempt to rein in the liberal application of general personal jurisdiction.
First, the Court detailed what types of contacts are sufficient to assert
general jurisdiction, but it failed to state why those contacts are critical in
light of the minimum contacts test set forth in International Shoe.76 Stated
another way, the Court missed an opportunity to provide any justification
in either policy or theory for the proper assertion of general jurisdiction.77
Is the requirement that the nature of a defendant’s contacts be such that it is
regarded as “essentially at home” rooted in ideas of reciprocal benefits,78
foreseeability,79 convenience to the defendant,80 state sovereignty,81 or
72. Id. at 2856 (quoting Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1037 (D.C. Cir.
1981)).
73. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54 (“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise
of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one
in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”) (emphasis added); id. at 2851 (“A court
may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any
and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’
as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”) (emphasis added); id. at 2857 (“Unlike
the defendant in Perkins, whose sole wartime business activity was conducted in Ohio, petitioners
are in no sense at home in North Carolina.”) (emphasis added).
74. Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 430.
75. Id.
76. Hoffheimer, supra note 14, at 594–95.
77. See generally Lea Brilmayer & Matthew Smith, The (Theoretical) Future of Personal
Jurisdiction: Issues Left Open by Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Brown and J. McIntyre Machinery v.
Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV., 617, 618–20 (2012) (discussing the absence of any political or theoretical
analysis in Goodyear and Nicastro, along with “collateral issues about the meaning and
consequences of state sovereignty”—including causality, symmetry, and international due process).
78. Brilmayer et al., A General Look, supra note 11, at 732.
79. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011) (noting that
“the defendant’s ability to anticipate suit renders the assertion of jurisdiction fair. In this way, the
opinion made foreseeability the touchstone of jurisdiction.”). But see Brilmayer et al., A General
Look, supra note 11, at 766 (noting that since International Shoe, the test for general jurisdiction is
more than simple foreseeability, it is a holistic look at fairness).
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predictability of a definite forum?82 Instead of providing a theoretical basis
for general personal jurisdiction, the Court’s decision was guided by a
“comparative evaluation of corporate activity,”83 discussing the facts in
Perkins and Helicopteros as compared to those in Goodyear.84 The natural
consequence of this gap in the Court’s analysis is that the significance of
its refined emphasis on the “home” base will be subsumed by the tendency
of lower courts to engage in an arbitrary comparative factual analysis.85
In addition to the Court’s failure to provide any theoretical guidance,
the decision also failed to provide a clear analytical framework for the
application of general jurisdiction. The decision can easily be interpreted as
adopting both a broad and narrow interpretation of the reach of general
jurisdiction. Some scholars have suggested that the case can be limited to
the rule that foreign manufacturers who sell their products in a state
through intermediaries do not have sufficient contacts to warrant the
application of general jurisdiction86—or that a stream of commerce theory
will not support the application of general jurisdiction.87 Read in this light,
lower courts can—and some already have88—limit Goodyear to its facts.
For example, in J.B. ex rel. Benjamin v. Abbott Laboratories Inc.,89 the
Northern District of Illinois rejected the defendant’s contention that
Goodyear changed the standard for asserting general jurisdiction, stating:
“the Supreme Court did not replace or redefine the well-established
standard for establishing general jurisdiction.”90 The court went on to find
general jurisdiction where the defendant “maintained regular, continuous
80. Brilmayer et al., A General Look, supra note 11, at 730.
81. Id. at 731.
82. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 7, at 1137.
83. Hoffheimer, supra note 14, at 551.
84. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2857 (2011).
85. See Twitchell, supra note 36, at 636–37, for a discussion on the confusion of lower court
opinions regarding general personal jurisdiction:
The melange of pre- and post-International Shoe formulas used to justify exercises
of general jurisdiction reveals that courts have not developed a coherent view of
the kind of analysis needed in this area. . . . The absence of policy analysis in cases
that purport to find general jurisdiction suggests that courts are unsure about what
policies support this exercise of jurisdiction. . . . [M]ost courts simply list the
defendant’s contacts and conclude that they are, or are not, sufficient.
Id.; see also Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, supra note 38, at 817 (“The Supreme Court’s
decisions have also not articulated any type of theoretical approach underlying general jurisdiction,
instead merely employing an ad hoc comparative analysis to prior precedent.”).
86. Hoffheimer, supra note 14, at 551.
87. Goodyear Dunlop, 131 S. Ct. at 2855.
88. For a discussion of two recent decisions narrowly interpreting Goodyear, see Hoffheimer,
supra note 14, at 600 n.286.
89. 12-CV-385, 2013 WL 452807 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2013).
90. Id. at *3.
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business contacts in the Southern District. By soliciting business, selling
and marketing products, and employing a sales team in the Southern
District, [the defendant] could reasonably anticipate being haled into the
District.”91 Absent from the decision was any reference to Justice
Ginsburg’s notion of “at home.”
On the other hand, Goodyear can be read broadly, as adopting a theory
that general jurisdiction should only be asserted against a foreign corporate
defendant if the forum is either its place of incorporation or its principal
place of business.92 Lower courts might support this broad reading by
referencing Justice Ginsburg’s characterization of Perkins as the
“paradigm” case,93 and her reference to only three examples where general
jurisdiction is appropriately exercised—an individual’s domicile and a
corporation’s principal place of business or its place of incorporation.94
Importantly, these divergent interpretations reveal that the “at home”
language adopted by the Court fails to provide a meaningful framework for
analyzing cases concerning the application of general personal jurisdiction.
The Court’s adoption of the “essentially at home” standard does
nothing to clarify what has up until now been the misapplication of general
jurisdiction.95 The Court’s failure to provide a theoretical justification for
general personal jurisdiction leaves the door open to future confusion as to
the significance and, more importantly, what it means to be “essentially at
home.” Additionally, the opinion’s lack of a coherent analytical framework
encourages divergent holdings on cases presenting identical facts.
Goodyear presented the court with the opportunity to resolve many issues
that have plagued lower courts in their consideration of general
91. Id.
92. Hoffheimer, supra note 14, at 585; Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853.
93. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54 (stating that the paradigm forum for an individual is that
individual’s domicile and that for a corporation the paradigm forum would be one where the
corporation is “fairly regarded as home”). Justice Sandra Day O’Connor referenced Professor
Brilmayer’s article, which identified the place of incorporation and the principal place of business
as appropriate forums for the exercise of general jurisdiction. Id. (citing Brilmayer et al., A General
Look, supra note 11, at 728).
94. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54.
95 In Florida alone, there are several examples of lower court decisions that have misapplied
the assertion of general jurisdiction. See Woods v. Nova Companies Belize Ltd, 739 So. 2d 617,
619 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (applying general jurisdiction over a foreign defendant based on the
cumulation of the defendant’s contacts in Florida relating to the cause of action); May v. Needham,
820 So. 2d 430, 431 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (asserting general jurisdiction over a foreign defendant
based on defendant’s sales to a Florida corporation, travel to Florida, and use of a Florida address);
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Herron, 828 So. 2d 414, 415-16 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding
general jurisdiction applied to a foreign defendant who was not incorporated in Florida and did not
have its principal place of business in Florida based on the quantity of sales, advertisements, and
business directed at Florida.); Northwestern Aircraft Capital v. Stewart, 842 So. 2d 190, 192 (Fla.
5th DCA 2003) (upholding the lower court’s assertion of general jurisdiction based solely on the
defendant’s purchases of jets in Florida; transportation of Florida residents into and out of the state;
and maintenance of its jets within the state).
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jurisdiction. The broad, ambiguous language of the case will surely present
more issues in years to come.
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